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Having something to look forward to is a keystone of well-being. Anticipation of a future re-
ward, like an upcoming vacation, can be more gratifying than the experience of reward it-
self. Theories of anticipation have described how it causes behaviors ranging from beneficial
information-seeking to harmful addiction. Here, we investigated how the brain generates and
enhances anticipatory pleasure, by analyzing brain activity of human participants who received
information predictive of future pleasant outcomes in a decision-making task. Using a compu-
tational model of anticipation, we show that three regions orchestrate anticipatory pleasure.
We show ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) tracks the value of anticipation; dopamin-
ergic midbrain responds to information that enhances anticipation, while the sustained activ-
ity in hippocampus provides for functional coupling between these regions. This coordinating
role for hippocampus is consistent with its known role in the vivid imagination of future out-
comes. Our findings throw new light on the neural underpinnings of how anticipation influences
decision-making, while also unifying a range of phenomena associated with risk and time-delay
preference.
*kiigaya@caltech.edu
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2Introduction
“Pleasure not known beforehand is half-wasted; to anticipate it is to double it.”
– Thomas Hardy, The Return of the Native
Standard economic theory suggests a reward is more attractive when it is imminent (e.g. eating
now) than when it is delayed (e.g. eating tomorrow), predicting that people always consume a reward
immediately. This so-called temporal discounting43, 66, 99 has been adapted with great success, such as
to design an artificial intelligence that can plan its future efficiently50, 81, 108 and to understand aspects
of the human mind.56, 80, 94, 103 However, real life behavior is more complex.4, 33, 37, 39, 75 Humans and
other animals sometimes prefer deliberately to postpone pleasant experiences (e.g. saving a piece
of cake for tomorrow, or delaying a one-time opportunity to kiss a celebrity75), clearly contradicting
simple temporal discounting.
An alternative idea in behavioral economics is that we enjoy, or savor, the moments leading to
reward, a notion known as the utility of anticipation.4, 16, 55, 67, 69, 75 This idea accounts for why people
occasionally prefer to delay reward (e.g. because we can enjoy the anticipation of eating a cake until
tomorrow by saving it now),75 as well as behavior such as information-seeking and addiction.16, 53
However, with notable exceptions,55 there have been few studies that have examined the neural basis
of the pleasure of anticipation, compared to the pleasure arising from reward itself5, 97, 102, 114 and
temporal discounting.56, 61, 65, 78, 80 For instance, it has been speculated, but never directly tested, that
the pleasure of anticipation arises from a vivid imagination of outcomes during waiting.75
Here we investigated the neurobiological mechanisms of anticipatory pleasure, by combining
computational modeling, a behavioral task, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We
fit our computational model53 of anticipatory utility75 to task behavior, and made predictions about the
timecourse of anticipatory pleasure in the brain for each participant. We then compared this predicted
signal with fMRI data, finding that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) encoded an antici-
patory pleasure signal. Additionally, dopaminergic midbrain encoded a signal reporting changes in
reward expectation. This so-called reward prediction error (RPE) is widely interpreted as a reinforce-
ment learning signal,46, 82, 86, 102 but our model predicts it acts to enhance anticipatory pleasure, which
in turn drives behavior. We show that in fact hippocampus mediates this enhancement, by enhancing a
functional coupling between two regions (the vmPFC and the dopaminergic midbrain). This can link
anticipatory pleasure to a vivid imagination of future reward, in light of a strong link of hippocampus
to memory and future imagination.12, 15, 47, 73, 90, 101
Results
Anticipation drives a preference for advance information
We previously formalized, and validated behaviorally, a theoretical model of anticipation.53 Here, we
wanted to directly test neurobiological predictions arising out of this model, using the same behavioral
task that we previously linked to anticipatory pleasure. In brief, our task examines how participants
change their preference for resolving uncertainty about future pleasurable outcomes, according to
reward probability and delay duration (please also see the Methods section). Participants made deci-
sions with full knowledge regarding conditions (probability, and delay, of reward outcomes) as these
were signaled with simple visual stimuli on each trial.
On each trial, participants chose between an immediate-information target (labeled ‘Find out
now’) and a delayed-information target (‘Keep it secret’). If the immediate-information target was
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Figure 1: Anticipation drives a preference for advance information. (A). Task. On each trial, participants were
presented with two lateral choice targets: an Immediate-information target (‘Find out now’) and a Delayed-
information target (‘Keep it secret’) as well as two central stimuli signaling the probability of reward (sampled
uniformly at random from 0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95) and the duration of a wait period until reward or no-reward
delivery (sampled uniformly at random from 1, 5, 10, 20, 40 s). Once participants chose a target, a symbolic
image cue was presented and remained present for the entire wait period. After this period, a rewarding image
or an image signaling no reward appeared. (B). The Immediate-information-target was followed by symbolic
cues that predict upcoming reward or no reward with no remaining ambiguity (reward predictive cue, or no-
reward predictive cue). The Delayed-information-target was followed by a cue that implied nothing about the
reward outcome (no-information cue), so that the future outcome remained uncertain during this wait period.
(C). Average behavior. Participants showed a stronger preference for advance information under the longer
delay conditions. The effect of reward probability was not significant at a group level (two-way ANOVA,
F4,950 = 10.0, p < 0.001 and F4,950 = 0.35, p > 0.05, respectively). See Figure S3 for individual differences.
(D). Computational model.53 Following a standard characterization of the utility of anticipation,75 our model
assumes that the value of each predictive cue is determined by the sum of (i) the utility of anticipation that
can be consumed while waiting for reward (red), and (ii) the value of reward consumption itself (green). The
value of anticipation is boosted by prediction errors associated with the reward predictive cues (purple upward
arrows). This boosts the values of predictive cues, capturing the preference of advance information.53 (E). The
model’s anticipatory value signal at time t is an integral of discounted future anticipation (urgency signal) at
t′ > t. This integrated signal evolves dynamically during the waiting period (red curve). (F). The average
of modeled preferences across participants. We fit our model to participants’ behavior using a hierarchical
Bayesian procedure. (G). The model (blue) captures the effect of delay conditions in data (black). The error
bars indicate the mean and standard errors of participants (n = 39). Please see Figure S1 for how other
classical models fail to capture the data. (H). The model’s prediction for fMRI signals (dotted red) is computed
by convolving the value signal (solid red) with the canonical haemodynamic response function (light blue).
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4chosen, one of two cues, each of which uniquely signaled if reward would or would not arrive, was
shown during the wait period (Figure 1B, left). If the delayed-information target was chosen, a
separate non-predictive cue that carries no information about an upcoming outcome was shown on
the screen during the wait period (Figure 1B, right), ultimately followed by reward or non-reward.
The reward image was randomly drawn from previously validated rewarding pictures,22, 53 and conse-
quently subject to immediate consumption (by viewing) upon delivery. The no-reward image was a
neutral image indicating no-reward.
In this design, participants’ choices did not affect final reward outcomes or duration of delays
(Figure 1B) and both were pre-determined and signaled to participants at the beginning of each trial.
Participants’ choices influenced when they received information about rewards alone (i.e. immedi-
ately, or after delays, i.e. when they actually received outcomes). Conventional temporal-discounting
predicts participants should be indifferent between the two choices, regardless of delay (please see
Figure S1). However, consistent with our previous findings,53 participants exhibited a preference for
advance information in a manner that varied systematically with delay (Figure 1C).
We accounted for this information-seeking behavior using a modified version of the standard
behavioral economic notion of the pleasure of anticipation, formally known as the utility (or economic
value) of anticipation.4, 16, 55, 67, 69, 75, 106 The standard model quantifies how people feel pleasure from
anticipation of a future outcome while waiting. This comes on top of the value that arises from
consumption of the outcome itself (Figure 1D). In behavioral economics, the anticipatory pleasure
arising from desired outcomes (e.g. reward) is known as savoring, while negative feelings arising
from anticipation of aversive outcomes (e.g. electric shock) is termed dread.75
However, by itself, the utility of anticipation does not capture participants’ preference for ad-
vanced information (Figure S153). We therefore proposed53 a modification to the original formu-
lation that people feel enhanced anticipatory pleasure after they unexpectedly discover a reward is
impending (Figure 1D). This proposal is based on experimental observations that such unexpected
discoveries lead animals to both become and remain more excited, than when animals waited for a
certain reward with no such surprising discoveries.105 Computationally, a surprise associated with
finding out about future reward (or no-reward) creates a reward prediction error (RPE), defined by a
change in expected value. Such RPEs are represented in the activity of dopamine neurons46, 82, 86, 102
— a neuromodulator that is also involved in enhanced motivation.45, 85, 100, 113 Therefore, in our model,
a RPE triggers an enhancement (boosting) of anticipatory utility. In our task, the cue predictive of
a future outcome that follows the immediate-information target creates a dopaminergic RPE, and it
triggers a boosting of the pleasure of anticipation. The non-predictive cue following the delayed-
information target does not generate RPE, thus it does not trigger any boosting.
It is important to note that a RPE is a phasic response that lasts only for a short period. However,
animals appear to remain excited for whole anticipatory periods,105 and so in the model, the enhance-
ment of anticipation is sustained throughout a wait period.53 Further, according to the model, surprise
is quantified by the absolute value of the prediction error (and so a boosting is big for large negative
RPEs as well as large positive ones). Taking an absolute value is a conventional mapping of predic-
tion error to surprise,89 and it also avoids unreasonable effects such as turning dread into savoring (by
multiplying a negative anticipatory value with a negative RPE-based boost).53 Therefore we expect
the boosting signal to be a prolonged representation of the absolute value of RPE, which will likely
be encoded in regions other than the ones encoding phasic RPEs.
We also note that the RPEs in our model are computed on the basis of the value of both anticipation
and reward consumption (see the Methods section). With this RPE boosting hypothesis, our model
captures a wide range of existing findings about information-seeking behavior, and offers potential
links to addiction and gambling53 (please also see the Discussion).
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5The value of anticipation, regardless of boosting, ramps up as the outcome approaches, but the
value is also subject to conventional discounting. This implies it carries less weight at the time of the
choice as the outcome is further delayed, reflected in a tilted inverted-U shape over time under typical
parameter settings (Figure 1E).
We fit our model to participants’ behavioral data using a hierarchical Bayesian scheme51, 53 (see
Methods section). As before,53 the model captured participants’ preferences for advance information
(Figure 1F,G). We stress that other standard models, such as models with discounted reward but
with no anticipatory value, or models with both discounted reward and anticipatory value but no
enhancement of anticipation, cannot capture a preference for advance information (Figure S1). We
formally tested this in a model comparison analysis using integrated Bayes Information Criterion
(iBIC; please see the Methods section53), which strongly favored our full model over other models
(Figure S2). However, despite the behavioral explanatory power, the neural roots of anticipation and
its boosting are largely unknown.
Here we wanted to elucidate the neurobiological basis of three key components in our boosted
anticipation model: namely, dynamic value representations of anticipatory pleasure; anticipation-
dependent RPE signal at advance information cues, and a boosting signal of anticipation. We were
also interested in how boosting relates to a vivid imagination of outcome, inspired by a long-standing,
but never-tested, hypothesis in behavioral economics that a vivid imagination of outcomes determines
the impact of anticipatory value.75
The vmPFC encodes the value of anticipation
We used each subject’s maximum a posteriori (MAP) parameters, based on an hierarchical model
fit,51–53 to estimate subject-specific time courses of several variables, including the two separate value
signals in our model: (i) discounted boosted-anticipatory value during wait periods (ii) discounted
reward value during the same periods, and (iii) prediction errors at cue presentation. These signals
were convolved with SPM’s default canonical HRF (Figure 1H; see Figure S4 for an example). As
illustrated in the Methods section, we separated predictive signals for savoring (anticipation of reward
with a positive value) and dread (anticipation of no reward with a negative value53).
We found the model’s anticipatory value signal correlated significantly with BOLD in ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (p < 0.05, whole brain FWE peak correction; MNI coordinates
[10, 50, 16], t = 6.02; Figure 2A), as well as dorsal caudate (p < 0.05, whole brain peak FWE cor-
rection; [−20,−2, 18], t = 5.81 Figure S5). These results are consistent with value representation of
imaginary reward reported in the vmPFC,8 and of reported anticipatory activity in vmPFC55, 57, 60 as
well as in caudate.28, 54, 63, 72, 98 Across the brain, we found no significant effect of dread that survived a
stringent whole-brain correction (see Figure S6). Thus, we focus on savoring (the anticipatory value
of future reward) referred to henceforth as anticipatory value.
Given a needed caution against potential false positives from auto-correlations in slowly-changing
signals,32 we conducted non-parametric, phase-randomization, tests wherein we scrambled the phases
of signals in a Fourier decomposition13, 71, 109 (Figure S7A). To do so, we transformed our model’s
predicted anticipatory value signal for each participant into Fourier space, randomized the phase of
each frequency component, and transformed the signal back to the original space. Only the regressor
being tested was randomized, while others were kept the same in the full GLM. We then performed a
standard analysis on this full GLM for each participant with the scrambled signal, and then conducted
a second level analysis. By repeating this procedure many times, we created a null distribution. To
protect this test against family-wise error, we constructed the null distribution by taking a maximum
value of correlation score across a region of interest, or across the whole brain, from each of our
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Figure 2: Neural representation of the anticipatory value signal in the vmPFC. (A). BOLD in vmPFC posi-
tively correlated with an anticipatory value signal (p < 0.001 according to a phase-randomization test; see
Figure S7). (B). The temporal dynamics of BOLD signal in vmPFC matched the model’s predictions during
the anticipation period. Changes in activity averaged over participants following receipt of a reward predictive
cue (Red), and after receipt of a no-information cue (magenta), are shown, as well as the model’s prediction for
each of these conditions (black). The error bar indicates the SEM over participants. The data was upsampled for
this plot, following.2 (C). A control, confirmatory, analysis shows that vmPFC did not correlate with a constant
expected value signal, defined by a boxcar regressor modulated by the probability of reward, but did so with
our model’s dynamic anticipatory utility signal. The average regression weights in vmPFC were significantly
larger than zero for our model’s predicted signal (p < 0.001 t-test, t38 = 3.93), while the average weights were
not significantly different from zero for the constant signal. The regression coefficients for the anticipatory
value signal was significantly greater than the coefficients to the constant value signal (p < 0.001, permutation
test). The error bars indicate the mean and SEM. Note that this is a confirmatory analysis, using the average
coefficients of cluster in vmPFC, instead of peak voxel. The anticipation signal was generated separately for
positive (reward) and negative (no-reward) part; the results for the positive part alone are shown in (A,B,C).
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7second level analysis, comparing against the correlation value in the original analysis. We found that
the effects in the vmPFC (p < 0.001 whole-brain FWE corrected) and the caudate (p < 0.01 whole
brain FWE corrected) survived this Fourier phase randomization test (Figure S7B). We note that
this phase-randomization test can be useful in both neuroimaging and electrophysiology studies for
avoiding false positive discoveries, particularly when analyzing correlations between slow signals.32
A more detailed inspection of these signals during the wait period showed the time course of the
vmPFC activity closely resembled our model’s predictions. In Figure 2B, we plot the time course
of fMRI signals in the vmPFC during the wait period separately for two conditions, namely when
participants received a reward predictive cue (red), and when participants received a no-information
cue (magenta). The time-courses track the model’s predictions in each condition (black).
We asked next whether BOLD in the vmPFC during the wait period correlated with a more con-
ventional signal such as expected outcome value. When the immediate-information cue is presented,
this is the same as the value of reward or no-reward without discounting or anticipatory modulation;
otherwise it is an average of the value of reward and no-reward weighted by their respective probabil-
ities. We examined the singular contribution of this signal by adding it as another parametric boxcar
regressor during waiting periods to the original GLM, and then compared the beta values between the
anticipatory value, and the expected value, regressor. In this way, we estimated the partial correlation
of each regressor. As shown in Figure 2C, the vmPFC BOLD still positively correlated with the
model’s anticipatory value signal, and the effect of an expected value signal was not significant.
Apart from an anticipatory value signal, we found that the model’s evolving discounted reward
value signal correlated significantly with activity in regions including the superior temporal gyrus
(p < 0.05, whole brain FWE peak correction; [−48,−48, 16], t = 5.28, Figure S8A). This also
survived a phase-randomization test (p < 0.001). For completeness, we report descriptively that an
anticipatory urgency signal, which is an anticipation signal before integration (see Methods section)
correlated with anterior insular cortex64 (peak voxel [34, 30, 2], which survived the phase randomiza-
tion test p < 0.01, Figure S8B).
The dopaminergic midbrain encodes anticipation-dependent reward prediction
errors at the time of predictive cues
The prediction error arising at advance cues is critical in our model, because it triggers the boosting of
anticipation. We calculated a full, signed, prediction error signal, occasioned at the onset of advance
information cues (reward predictive, no-reward predictive, and no-information cues), calculated by
the discounted value of anticipation (of both savoring and dread) and that of outcomes. Because
of the boosting, the value of the immediate information target and the amount of prediction error
arising from the subsequent predictive cues are recursively computed in a self-consistent manner (see
Methods). In this regard it differs from a conventional temporal difference (TD) prediction error,82, 108
which only considers conventionally discounted outcomes and does not involve boosting. We have
previously shown computationally that this signal encompasses a previously-described “information
prediction error”9–11, 18, 79 (see also the Discussion section).
Based on extensive prior studies, we hypothesized that a signed prediction error signal arising at
the time of predictive cues would be encoded in the midbrain dopaminergic regions and the ventral
striatum (e.g.24, 48, 87, 102). Indeed, the model’s signal correlated significantly with BOLD in a midbrain
dopaminergic region encompassing the ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra (VTA/SN) (Figure
3A; p < 0.05, small volume FWE correction;48 [4,−26, 20], t = 3.78). We also found that BOLD in
the medial posterior parietal cortex (mPPC)36, 110 correlated significantly with the model’s predicted
signal (Figure 3A; p < 0.05, cluster-level whole brain FWE correction with the height threshold
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Figure 3: Neural representation of prediction error signals. (A) The mPPC and the VTA/SN BOLD positively
correlated with the model’s anticipatory reward prediction errors at the time of advance information cue pre-
sentations (reward predictive, no-reward predictive, and no-information cues) (mPPC: p < 0.01, whole-brain
FWE. VTA/SN: p < 0.01 FWE small volume correction). Voxels at p < 0.005 (uncorrected) are highlighted
for display purposes. (B) Our illustrative, confirmatory, analysis shows that BOLD signals in both the mPPC
and the VTA/SN positively correlated with the model’s prediction error signal (including anticipation and out-
come), but not with a simpler, so-called state prediction error signal (1−preward when reward predictive cue was
presented, |0 − preward| when no-reward predictive cue was presented). The differences between the average
regression coefficients in the mPPC and in the VTA/SN were significant in the mPPC (p < 0.001, a standard
permutation test in which we permuted the average regression coefficients), and the VTA/SN (p < 0.001 per-
mutation test). The average correlation with the model’s prediction error signal was significant both in the
mPPC and the VTA/SN (p < 0.001 for the mPPC and the VTA/SN; t-test t38 = 3.56 and t38 = 3.15). (C) An-
other confirmatory analysis shows that at the time of a potentially informative cue, BOLD in the mPPC and the
VTA/SN positively correlated with the model’s outcome cue value signal, and negatively with the model’s ex-
pected value signal, indicating both regions express canonical prediction errors. This difference was significant
in the mean coefficients in the mPPC (p < 0.001 permutation test) and the mean coefficients in the VTA/SN
(p < 0.001 permutation test). The positive correlation with outcome values and the negative correlation with
expected values were all significant in the mean values of the mPPC and the mean values of VTA/SN (outcome:
p < 0.01 for the mPPC and the VTA/SN by t-test t38 = 3.40 and t38 = 3.24, expectation: p < 0.001 for the
mPPC and p < 0.01 for the VTA/SN by t-test t38 = 4.37 and t38 = 2.82). Note that (B) and (C) are confirma-
tory analysis, using the average coefficients of clusters in the mPPC and the VTA/SN, instead of peak voxels.
The three stars indicate p < 0.001, and two stars indicate p < 0.01.
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9p < 0.001; k = 166, peak at [0,−42, 50].). We did not find significant associations in the ventral
striatum, perhaps because cue- and reward onsets were unusually temporally distant (up to 40 sec), or
it is rather consistent with a previous report that the anticipation of reward triggers a dopamine release
in the caudate, but not in the ventral striatum.98
BOLD in the mPPC has previously been reported to covary with a simpler prediction error signal,
the state prediction error signal.40 In our experiment, this state-prediction-error signal is the abso-
lute value of the difference between outcome (1 or 0) and expectation (the presented probability of
reward). To rule out state prediction error as a driver of our results, we performed a confirmatory
analysis, by constructing a GLM that included the model’s full prediction error signal and its state
prediction error signal, and the compared the beta values of partial correlations associated with these
regressors. For both the mPPC (cluster defined by our functional analysis as above, conservatively for
this analysis with p < 0.001 uncorrelated, which encompasses the peak voxel with FWE p < 0.05)
and the VTA/SN (cluster defined anatomically48), the mean beta values in clusters correlated signifi-
cantly with the model’s prediction error signal, but not with the state prediction error signal (Figure
3B).
Further, previous studies suggested that significant correlations reported between fMRI signals
and prediction errors might be attributable to a strong correlation with outcomes (reward or no re-
ward) alone, regardless of the presence of negative correlations with expectation at outcome.2, 21, 62
To rule out this possibility, we performed another confirmatory analysis by constructing a GLM with
separate regressors for the values of outcomes and expectations. BOLD in both the mPPC (cluster
defined by our functional analysis as above) and the VTA/SN (anatomically defined cluster48) pos-
itively correlated with outcome value and negatively correlated with expected value (Figure 3C).
Thus, responses in these regions had characteristic of canonical prediction error signals.2, 21, 62
The hippocampus correlates with boosting of anticipation
Our computational model predicts people experience enhanced anticipation following a reward pre-
diction error, occasioned by advance information cues in our task. In our model, the magnitude of
enhancement (or boosting) is quantified by the amount of surprise participants experienced,89 defined
by the absolute value of reward prediction error. Also, the boosting is expected to be prolonged over
the entire duration of a wait period (Figure 4A). In original work on the utility of anticipation,75 the
strength of anticipation was speculated to be related to a vivid imagination of desired outcomes. In
our computational model, the latter can be re-stated in terms of whether this vivid imagination relates
to the boosting of anticipation.
Previous research suggests that the hippocampus is an ideal substrate for this effect. First, in
the context of recognition tasks, the hippocampus encodes unsigned error (mismatch, novelty) sig-
nal.19, 25, 31, 70, 74, 107 Additionally, many studies link hippocampal activity to the imagination of future
prospects (e.g.12, 47, 73, 101), where prefrontal-medial temporal interactions influence the effects of imag-
ination on valuation,90 as well as support the mental construction of future events.15 This suggests
that the boosting of anticipatory value is mediated by enhancing hippocampal-dependent imagination
of associated outcomes.
To test this we first examined activity in the hippocampus in response to the absolute value of the
model’s prediction error at the time the advance information cue was presented. As predicted, we
found hippocampal activity was significantly correlated with the magnitude of the model’s unsigned
prediction error (p < 0.05 FWE small volume correction by neurosynth; peak voxel at [32,−24,−12],
t = 3.60, Figure 4B).
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Figure 4: Neural correlates of boosting in the hippocampus. (A). Our model predicts that dopaminergic reward
prediction error triggers a boosting of anticipation. The boosting is quantified by the absolute value of reward
prediction error. In contrast to the phasic, short, reward prediction error signal, the effect of boosting needs
to be sustained during the anticipatory period. (B). The absolute value of the model’s prediction error signal
significantly correlated with BOLD in the hippocampus (FWE p < 0.05 small volume correction).
Midbrain-hippocampus-vmPFC circuit dynamically computes anticipatory value
We next asked whether boosted hippocampal activity persisted throughout the delay period, as pre-
dicted by our computational model. Indeed, we found that the activity in the hippocampus was
boosted in rewarded, immediate-information, trials throughout the wait period, compared to uncer-
tain, delayed-information, trials (Figure 5A; see also Figure S9). Thus, in addition to expressing the
magnitude of prediction error at advance information cues, hippocampal BOLD during the wait pe-
riod expresses a sustained variable related to anticipation. This mixed coding of prediction error and
anticipation-like signal suggests that hippocampus connects reciprocally with both to the VTA/SN74
and to the vmPFC,15 playing a central role in boosting anticipation. Hippocampal-vmPFC connec-
tion has been strongly tied with vivid future imagination15 and on this basis we hypothesized that
hippocampal-dependent prospective process realize boosting, linking computations in the VTA/SN
(prediction error) and the vmPFC (boosted-anticipatory value).
To formally test this idea, we analyzed functional connectivity using dual psychophysical interac-
tion (PPI) regressors based on two a priori seed regions: 1) the vmPFC (which encodes anticipatory
value) and the model’s full, signed, prediction error signal at predictive cues (which is encoded at
the VTA/SN) as a psychological variable, and 2) the VTA/SN (which encodes prediction error) as a
seed and the model’s anticipatory value signal (which is encoded at the vmPFC) as a psychological
variable. Because each of these two PPI regressors includes variables relating to both the vmPFC
(anticipation) and the VTA/SN (prediction error), and these variables are coupled in our computa-
tional model through the notion of boosting, this analysis tests our hypothesis that the hippocampus
links the VTA/SN (prediction error) and the vmPFC (anticipation) as a potential medium of boosting.
Thus we included these two sets of regressors into the single GLM we used so far used (see Methods
section), and tested if hippocampal activity significantly correlated with these PPI regressors.
We found significant correlations in the hippocampus for both PPI regressors. Thus, a functional
coupling between the VTA/SN (the area encoding reward prediction errors) and the hippocampus104
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Figure 5: Functional connectivity analysis suggestive of a neural network for anticipatory value computation.
(A). The temporal dynamics of fMRI signal in the hippocampus. Changes in activity averaged over participants
after receiving a reward predictive cue (orange), and after receiving a no-information cue (magenta), are shown.
The coding of boosting-related value are prolonged over the course of wait period, which is what our model
predicted. The error bar indicates the SEM. Please also see Figure S9. (B). Functional coupling between the
VTA/SN and the hippocampus is positively modulated by the model’s anticipatory value signal (PPI regressor:
BOLD signal in VTA/SN modulated by model’s anticipatory value signal (encoded in vmPFC); p < 0.05 FWE
small volume correction). (C). Functional coupling between the vmPFC and the hippocampus is positively
modulated by model’s prediction error signal (PPI regressor: BOLD signal in vmPFC modulated by model’s
prediction error signal. p < 0.05 FWE small volume correction). PPI regressors in (B) and (C) were chosen
because each of them includes variables relating to both the VTA/SN (prediction error) and the vmPFC (an-
ticipatory value), allowing us to test if the hippocampus links to both these two regions in a way predicted by
our computational model. Note that (B) and (C) are partial correlation results from the same analysis using a
single GLM with the two PPI regressors that are symmetrically orthogonalized. (D). The functional coupling
strength between the vmPFC and the hippocampus mediated by the model’s prediction error signal is positively
correlated with the model’s boosting coefficient parameter estimated by behavior of participants (r = 0.37,
p < 0.05). (E). Functional network for anticipatory value computation. Three distinctive regions play together
to construct the anticipatory value, in a manner that is predicted by our computational model. The 3D brain
image was constructed by the mean T1 brain images, which were cut at y = 34 and z = 15 for illustrative
purposes.
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was significantly modulated by our model’s anticipatory value signal (p < 0.05, FWE small volume
correction by Neurosynth hippocampus mask; peak voxel at [22,−32,−6], t = 3.89, Figure 5B).
Additionally, a functional coupling between the vmPFC and the hippocampus111 was significantly
modulated by our model’s prediction error signal (p < 0.05, FWE small volume correction by Neu-
rosynth hippocampus mask; peak voxel at [−30,−34,−6], t = 3.70, Figure 5C).
If the hippocampal-vmPFC coupling is responsible for the boosting of anticipation, the coupling
strength that we estimated in our PPI analysis should relate to the magnitude of boosting. We es-
timated the magnitude of boosting from participants’ behavior by model fitting. The linear boost-
ing coefficient (parameter C) is a constant that is unique to each participant and determines the im-
pact of RPE on boosting. Over participants we found a significant positive correlation between the
hippocampal-vmPFC coupling strength, estimated from fMRI data, and the model’s linear boost-
ing coefficient (parameter C), estimated from each participant’s behavior (Figure 5D). Note that the
model’s boosting coefficient is different from a simple behavioral measure, such as a choice depen-
dence on reward probabilities (Figure S10).
These functional connectivity results support our hypothesis that hippocampus plays a key coor-
dinating role in boosting the pleasure of anticipation, linking the vmPFC’s encoding of the value of
anticipation with the VTA/SN’s encoding of prediction errors at advance information. The findings
point to these regions functioning as a large-scale neural network for boosting pleasure of anticipation
(Figure 5E), driving a preference for advance information and curiosity.
Discussion
While the pleasure (utility) of anticipation has long been recognized as a key notion in behavioral eco-
nomics, its neural mechanism remains surprisingly unexplored. Recent behavioral evidence suggests
that anticipatory pleasure is enhanced as the likelihood of a desired experience increases unexpect-
edly. This psychological process links anticipatory utility theory to a wide range of suboptimal human
behavior, such as information-seeking, risk-seeking, and addiction. Here, we took advantage of a new
link between computational theory and behavior, and applied it to a laboratory experiment with fMRI,
to reveal how anticipatory pleasure arises in the brain (please see Figure S11 for a visual summary of
the Discussion section).
Crucially, we show a network for computing the utility of anticipation, consisting of three dis-
tinctive brain regions. First, we show vmPFC represents the time course of an anticipatory utility
signal that evolved during a waiting period. Second, dopaminergic midbrain regions, encompassing
VTA/SN, encoded the model’s prediction error that signals changes in expected value (prediction
error). Third, hippocampal activity which indexed an unsigned prediction error was functionally
coupled both to vmPFC and to the VTA/SN, in a manner consistent with our model’s predicted boost-
ing of anticipation with prediction error. One plausible cognitive account of these findings is that a
dopaminergic prediction error signal projected to hippocampus74 serves to amplify vivid imagination
of future outcomes,12, 15, 47, 73, 90, 101 and this in turn strengthens the pleasure of anticipation.75
Our study provides insights into neural processes underling suboptimal human decision-makings.
One example in our current study concerns a preference for early resolution of uncertainty,16, 33, 38, 68, 69
also known as information-seeking,9, 10, 18, 41, 116 or observing.3, 29 Humans and other animals are will-
ing to incur costs to find out their true fate, even if this knowledge does not change actual out-
come.7, 14, 18, 33, 59, 76 An alternative idea, as oppose to our boosted anticipatory utility, is that people
feel pleasure from information itself.10, 42, 68 However this so-called intrinsic value of information
cannot explain why a preference for advance information is valence-dependent,18, 58 that it depends
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incorrectly on the reward probability,23, 96 and a sensitivity to delay until reward (as we also demon-
strated here).53, 105 All of these findings are natural consequence of the pleasure of anticipation.
Previous neural findings about the intrinsic value of information can be accounted for by our
model of anticipation. This so-called information-prediction-error signal is presumed to arise from
the value of information,9–11, 18, 79 and has been reported in the same midbrain dopaminergic regions
as standard reward prediction errors,9, 10 implying that the two signals might be strongly related.84
Indeed, our model accounts for information prediction errors as a side effect of anticipation-dependent
reward predictions, which we show correlates with BOLD signal in dopaminergic midbrain regions9, 10
as well as in the mPPC36 (see also110).
Our results offer alternative accounts for addiction, and the possibility of individually-tailored psy-
chiatric interventions (Figure S11). While initial phases of addiction93 involve excessive dopamine
release at the time of drug consumption,92 later phases involve craving,91, 95 a close relation to savoring
of anticipation. Our model implies that people boost craving when the likelihood of drug administra-
tion increases (e.g. when purchasing drugs). People may feel greater pleasure from obtaining drugs
(which can act as a kind of conditioned stimuli35) than from administering them, because the for-
mer includes values associated with the anticipation of future administration. Importantly, our model
predicts that people with certain parameter values (e.g. large boosting coefficients) could repeatedly
over-boost the pleasure of anticipating drugs, resulting in excessive, pathological, drug seeking (see
Eq.(12)). By fitting our model to subjects performing the task used here, we can in principle link an
individual’s tendency toward addiction with unique cause of this disorder (e.g. excessive boosting or
unbalance between anticipation and discounting). This can in turn suggest interventions tailored to in-
dividual patients, such as cognitive behavioral therapy focusing on controlling anxiety and craving,34
as well as possible dopaminergic antagonists to control boosting.
Our study also unifies separate notions concerning gambling: preference for risk and time-delay.
While these two economic phenomena are often been treated separately there is increasing evidence
in favor of an interactive relationship (e.g.1, 17). Our computational model of anticipation explicitly
offers an interaction between risk (prediction error) and delay (anticipation), because the former can
enhance the value of latter. This interaction creates well-documented effects, such as nonlinear coding
of probabilities of anticipated rewards.49 Further studies may allow us to design a behavioral task for
psychiatric interventions, in which patients can lessen their preference for addicted substances, or
even their risk preference in general, because our model can find the optimal task parameters for each
individual to achieve this goal.
Our study offers an alternative view to a long-standing problem in neuroscience and machine-
learning. The so-called temporal credit assignment problem raises the issue of how neurons operating
on a timescale of milliseconds learn relationships on a behaviorally relevant timescale (such as actions
and rewards in our task), while designing a machine learning algorithm overcoming this problem also
remains to be a challenge. A recent physiological study demonstrated that synaptic plasticity in hip-
pocampal pyramidal neurons can learn associations on a behaviorally relevant timescale, with the aid
of ramping-like, slow, external inputs in a realistic setting.6 Our results suggest that a slow anticipa-
tory value signal in the vmPFC could serve as such an input to neurons in the hippocampus, bridging
a gap over behavioral timescales. A dopaminergic input from the VTA/SN to the hippocampus may
facilitates this type of learning.44, 74 Therefore our study suggests that anticipation processes may
serve to bridge a gap in the temporal credit assignment problem.
Neuroeconomic studies show that people make decisions between goods in different categories, by
expressing the value of those goods in a common currency primarily encoded in the vmPFC (e.g.20).
Here we found that the utility of anticipation is indeed computed in the vmPFC. This invites an
alternative interpretation of previously reported ramping activity in the vmPFC while waiting for
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rewards30, 83, 115 in terms of an anticipation-sensitive value signal, which has been instead interpreted
as a reward-timing signal.
We also note an influential suggestion16 that future uncertainty drives other forms of anticipatory
utility, such as anxiety. We did not consider this notion directly in our analysis; but in our model
an agent can experience a mixture of positive (savoring) and negative (dread) utilities of anticipation
according to the probabilities of these outcomes. It would be interesting to study how this mixed
anticipatory utility of our model relates to the notion of anxiety,16 which may help the design of more
effective psychiatric interventions for anxiety disorders.
In sum, we identified novel neural substrates for computing the pleasure arising from anticipation,
orchestrated by three distinctive brain regions with different associated functions. We suggest this
anticipatory pleasure drives a range of behaviors including information-seeking, addiction, and gam-
bling. Our study also provides a seed for individually tailored interventions for psychiatric disorders.
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Methods
Participants
Thirty-nine self-declared heterosexual male participants were recruited from the University College
London (UCL) community. Participants provided informed consent for their participation in the study,
which was approved by the UCL ethics committee.
Experimental task
The task was a variant of that in,53 which itself was inspired by a series of animal experiments into
information-seeking or observing behavior (e.g.9, 105). At the beginning of each trial, a pair of task-
information stimuli (hourglass and partially-covered human silhouette) were shown along with two
choice targets. The number on the hour-glass indicated how long the participants had to wait until
to see a reward or no-reward, where 1/2, 1, 2 4, 8 hour-glass meant 1, 5, 10, 20, 40 sec of waiting
time, respectively. The other stimulus, a partially-covered human silhouette, indicated the probability
of seeing a reward, specified by the area of uncovered semi-circle (5, 25, 50, 75, 95 % chance of
rewards). Two lateral rectangular targets were presented as choices: the Immediate-Information target
marked as ‘find out now’, and the Delayed-Information target marked as ‘keep it secret’. The positions
of the hourglass, and the covered silhouette, were kept the same every trial, but the locations of choice
targets were randomly alternated between left and right on each trial.
The participants were required to choose between left and right targets by pressing a button within
three seconds. Once the participants chose a target, one of the three cues appeared in the center of the
screen. If the participants chose the Immediate-information target, then a cue that signalled upcoming
reward or no-reward appeared on the screen until the onset of reward or no-reward. If the participant
chose the Delayed-information target, a cue that signalled no-information about reward appeared on
the screen. The meaning of the cues were fully instructed to participants beforehand. The meanings of
the cues were counter-balanced across subjects. In order to ensure immediate consumption, rewards
were images of attractive female models from a set that had previously been validated as being suit-
ably appetitive to heterosexual male subjects;22, 53 reward images were presented for 1s. Images were
chosen randomly from the top 100 highest rated pictures that were introduced in.22 No image was
presented more than twice to the same participants. In case of no-reward, an image signaling absence
of a reward was presented for 1s. In either case, a blank screen was presented for 1s before starting a
new trial. These timings were set to reduce the timing uncertainty which may cause prediction error
that can interfere with our model’s value computation.62
Participants were fully instructed about the task structure including the meaning of stimuli about
the probability and delay conditions, as well as the advance information cues. Then participants un-
derwent extensive training that consisted of three tasks: a variable-delay but fixed probability task, a
fixed-delay but variable probability task, a variable-delay and variable-probability task. This ensured
that participants had fully learned the task and had adequately developed preferences before being
scanned. Scanning was split into three separate runs, each of which consisted of 25 trials that cov-
ered all conditions once. Trial orders were randomized across participants. Subjects had a break of
approximately 30 sec between runs.
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Computational model
The model for the task was fully described in.53 Briefly, following Loewenstein’s suggestion that
the anticipation of rewards itself has hedonic value4, 75 (e.g. subjects enjoy thinking about rewards
while waiting for them), we extended a standard reinforcement learning framework to include explicit
reward anticipation, i.e., savoring. The model’s innovation is to suggest that the value of anticipation
can be boosted by reward prediction errors associated with advance information about upcoming
rewards.53
To describe the model formally, consider a task in which if a subject chooses the Immediate-
Information target, then they receive at t = 0 a reward predictive cue S+ with a probability of q, or
a negative-reward predictive cue S− with a probability of 1 − q. Subsequently, the subject receives
a reward or no-reward at t = T (= TDelay), with a value of R+ or R−, respectively. In our recent
experiment we have found that subjects assigned a negative value to an absence of reward;53 but
this is not necessary to account for preference for advance information that has been observed in
animals.39, 105
Based on the observation that subjects prefer to delay consumption of certain types of rewards,
Loewenstein proposed that subjects enjoy anticipation while waiting to enjoy the actual reward.4, 75, 106
Formally, the anticipation of the reward at time t is worth a(t) = Re−ν(T−t), where ν governs its
rate. Including R itself, and taking temporal discounting into account, the total value of the reward
predictive cue, QS+ , is
QS+ = η V
[Anticipation] + V [Reward]
= η
∫ T
0
e−γt
′
a(t′)dt′ +R+e−γT
= η
R+
ν+ − γ
(
e−γT − e−ν+T
)
+R+e−γT , (1)
where η is the relative weight of anticipation, γ+ is the discounting rate, and T is the duration of delay
until the reward is delivered. In prior work, η had been treated as a constant that relates to subject’s
ability of imagine future outcomes77 ; however, we proposed that it can vary with the prediction
error δpe at the time of the predicting cue.53 Our proposal was inspired by findings of a dramatically
enhanced excitement that follows such cues.105 A simple form of boosting arises from the relationship
η = η0 + C|δpe| (2)
where η0 specifies the base anticipation, andC determines the gain. That anticipation is boosted by the
absolute value of RPE is important in applying our model to comparatively unpleasant outcomes.53
We also note that the boosting is sustained throughout a wait period, unlike phasic RPE signals.102
The total value of the no-reward predictive cue, QS− , is then
QS− = η
∫ T
0
e−γ
−t′a(t′)dt′ +R−e−γ
−T
= η
R−
ν− − γ−
(
e−γ
−T − e−ν−T
)
+R−e−γ
−T . (3)
Following our previous work, we assumed that γ = γ+ = γ−.
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Note that in our model, RPE affects the total cue values QS+ and QS− , which in turn also affect
subsequent RPEs. Therefore the linear ansatz for the boosting of anticipation on RPE (Eq.(2) could
lead to instability due to unbounded boosting. This instability could account for maladaptive behavior
such as addiction and gambling. However, in a wide range of parameters, this ansatz has a stable, self-
consistent, solution. In our experiment, the prediction error for the reward and no-reward predictive
cues can be expressed as
δS
+
pe = QS+ − (qQS+ + (1− q)QS−) (4)
δS
−
pe = QS− − (qQS+ + (1− q)QS−) , (5)
which are, assuming the linear ansatz,δ
S+
pe = (1− q)
((
η0 + C|δS+pe |
)
A+ +B+ −
((
η0 + C|δS−pe |
)
A− +B−
))
δS
−
pe = −q
((
η0 + C|δS+pe |
)
A+ +B+ −
((
η0 + C|δS−pe |
)
A− +B−
)) (6)
where 
A+ = R
+
ν+−γ
(
e−γT − e−ν+T
)
A− = R
−
ν−−γ
(
e−γT − e−ν−T
)
B+ = R+e−γT
B− = R−e−γT
(7)
Assuming that R− ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ R+, Equations (6) impose that δS+pe > 0 and δS−pe < 0. With this,
Equations (6) can be reduced toδS
+
pe =
(1−q)(η0(A+−A−)+B+−B−)
1−C((1−q)A+−qA−)
δS
−
pe =
−q(η0(A+−A−)+B+−B−)
1−C((1−q)A+−qA−)
(8)
Because (η0 (A+ − A−) +B+ −B−) > 0, in order that δS+pe > 0 and δS−pe < 0 hold for all q and T ,
the denominators must be positive for all 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T . In other words,
1− C ((1− q)A+ − qA−) > 0. (9)
for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T , meaning that
C <
1
((1− q)A+ − qA−) , (10)
for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T . This means that
C <
1
max (A+, |A−|) (11)
for 0 ≤ T . It is straightforward to show that A+ takes its maximum at T = ln(
γ
ν+
)
γ−ν+ , and |A−| at
T =
ln( γ
ν− )
γ−ν− . Thus the condition that the linear ansatz gives a stable self-consistent solution is
C < min
(
γ
R+
( γ
ν+
) ν+
γ−ν+
,
−γ
R−
( γ
ν−
) ν−
γ−ν−
)
(12)
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In our model-fitting, we imposed this stability condition. However, we note that it is also possible that
some people violate this condition. This could account for maladaptive behavior such as addiction
and pathological risk seeking.
An alternative to imposing such a stability condition would be to assume that boosting saturates
in a non-linear manner:53
η = η0 + c1 tanh (c2|δpe|) .
However, the model’s qualitative behavior does not depend strongly on the details of the RPE depen-
dence of anticipation.53 Hence we only used the linear ansatz in our analysis in the current study.
We note that our current computational model53 was originally introduced in light of an exper-
imental refutation10 of an earlier reinforcement-learning model for information-seeking (observing)
behavior.3 This early computational model3 appealed to the same underlying idea discussed here,
namely that of a Pavlovian influence27 of a prediction error signal over actions.26 The present model
considers an anticipatory process (a type of an internal action26), in contrast to this earlier model that
characterized this effect in terms of suppressed forgetting.
We generated choice probability88 from our model by taking a difference between the expected
value of immediate information target and that of delayed information target and taking it through
sigmoid with a noise parameter σ.53
For our model comparison, we also fit a model with no anticipation η = 0, and a model with an
anticipation but that is not boosted by RPE C = 0.
Behavioral Model fitting
We used a hierarchical Bayesian, random effects analysis.51–53 In this, the (suitably transformed)
parameters hi of participant i are treated as a random sample from a Gaussian distribution with means
and variance θ = {µθ,Σθ} characterising the whole population of subjects; and we find the maximum
likelihood values of θ.
The prior distribution θ can be set as the maximum likelihood estimate:
θML ≈ argmaxθ {p (D|θ)} (13)
= argmaxθ
{
N∏
i=1
∫
dhi p (Di|hi) p (hi|θ)
}
We optimized θ using an approximate Expectation-Maximization procedure. For the E-step of the
k-th iteration, a Laplace approximation gives us
mki ≈ argmaxh
{
p (Di|h) p
(
h|θk−1)} (14)
p
(
hki |Di
) ≈ N (mki ,Σki ) , (15)
where N (mki ,Σki ) is a Normal distribution with mean mki and covariance Σki that is obtained from
the inverse Hessian around mki . For the M step:
µk+1θ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
mki (16)
Σk+1θ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
mkim
kT
i + Σ
k
i
)− µk+1θ µk+1Tθ . (17)
For simplicity, we assumed that the covariance Σkθ had zero off-diagonal terms, assuming that the
effects were independent.51
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Model comparison
We compared the goodness of fit for different computational models according to their integrated
Bayes Information Criterion (iBIC) scores.51, 53 We analyzed log-likelihood of data D given a model
M , log p(D|M):
log p (D|M) =
∫
dθp (D|θ) p (θ|M) (18)
≈ −1
2
iBIC = log p
(
D|θML)− 1
2
|M | log |D|, (19)
where iBIC is the integrated Bayesian Information Criterion, |M | is the number of fitted prior pa-
rameters and |D| is the number of data points (total number of choice made by all subjects). Here,
log p
(
D|θML) can be computed by integrating out individual parameters:
log p
(
D|θML) = ∑
i
log
∫
dhp (Di|h) p
(
h|θML) (20)
≈
∑
i
log
1
K
K∑
j=1
p
(
Di|hj
)
, (21)
where we approximated the integral as the average over K samples hj’s generated from the prior
p
(
h|θML).
Model’s fMRI predictions
Our computational model makes specific predictions about temporal dynamics of anticipatory, re-
ward, value signals during wait periods, as well as unique anticipatory reward prediction error signals
at predictive cue onsets. Using the parameters (MAP estimates) for each participant, we generated
the following variables for each participant as parametric regressors for the fMRI analysis.
The temporal dynamics of anticipatory value signal for positive domain at time t during wait
period, until reward onsets t = T are:
VAnticipation,+ (t) =
R+
(
η0 + C|δ[S
+,q,T ]
pe |
)
ν+ − γ
(
e−γ(T−t) − e−ν+(T−t)
)
(22)
for the negative domain:
VAnticipation,− (t) =
R−
(
η0 + C|δ[S
−,q,T ]
pe |
)
ν− − γ
(
e−γ(T−t) − e−ν−(T−t)
)
(23)
We expressed these as two separate regressors.
The prediction errors δ[+/−,q,T ]pe are determined for each delay T and reward probability q condition
self-consistently (see below). After a Delayed-Information choice, these signals are scaled by the
probability of reward q or no-reward 1 − q (and no prediction errors). Note that we set R+ = 1
without loss of generality.
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The discounted reward signal at t during the wait period is expressed as
VReward,+ (t) = R
+e−γ(T−t), (24)
while the discounted no-reward signal at t is
VReward,− (t) = R−e−γ(T−t). (25)
Note that the anticipatory value signal is an integral of (discounted) anticipation urgency signal:
VAnt. Urgency,+ (t) = R
+
(
η0 + C|δ[S
+,q,T ]
pe |
)
e−ν
+(T−t), (26)
and
VAnt. Urgency,− (t) = R−
(
η0 + C|δ[S
−,q,T ]
pe |
)
e−ν
−(T−t), (27)
which we also included to the GLM.
The reward prediction errors at information cue onsets are computed for each condition (q, T )
self-consistently according to Eqs.(8). That isδ
[S+,q,T ]
pe =
(1−q)(η0(A+−A−)+B+−B−)
1−C((1−q)A+−qA−)
δ
[S−,q,T ]
pe =
−q(η0(A+−A−)+B+−B−)
1−C((1−q)A+−qA−)
(28)
where A+/−, B+/−, are given by Eqs.(7). In our analysis we put positive and negative prediction
errors as a single parametric regressor at information cue onsets. Note that the anticipatory/reward
prediction error signal is different from other conventional prediction error signals, including the so-
called state prediction errors:40 {
δS
+
spe = |1− q|
δS
−
spe = |0− q|,
(29)
which we used for a control analysis.
fMRI data acquisition
We acquired MRI data using a Siemens Trio 3Tesla scanner with a 32-channel head coil. The EPI
sequence was optimized for minimal signal dropout in striatal, medial prefrontal, and brainstem re-
gions:112 40 slices with 3-mm isotropic voxels with repetition time (TR) 2.8 s and echo time (TE) 30
ms, and slice tilt 30 degrees. Additionally, field maps (3-mm isotropic, whole-brain) were acquired
to correct the EPIs for field-strength inhomogeneity.
fMRI analysis
We used SPM12 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL, London) for standard preprocess-
ing and image analysis. The first 5 scans of each session were discarded to account for T1-saturation
effects. The standard preprocessing includes: slice-timing correction; realigned and unwarped with
the field maps that were obtained before the task; co-registration of structural T1 weighted images
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to the sixth functional image of each subject; segmenting structural images into grey matter, white
matter and cerebral spinal fluid; normalising structural and functional images spatially to the Mon-
treal Neurological Institute (MNI) space; spatially smoothing with a Gaussian kernel with full-width
half-maximum of 8mm. The motion correction parameters were estimated from the realignment pro-
cedure, and were included to the first level GLM analysis.
We regressed fMRI time series with GLMs that consist of onset regressors and our model’s sig-
nals, as well as nuisance regressors. Onset regressors included the presentations of the initial screen,
the presentations of cues, the presentation of outcomes. The parametric modulated regressors were
added to the presentation of cues with model’s prediction error signal, and outcome onset with the
value of reward or no reward. The onsets of cues preceding the shortest delay (1s) was separately
modeled so that the prediction errors at the cues were not affected by reward. The time course of
our model’s signals included the anticipatory value signals for positive and negative domains, the dis-
counted value signals for positive and negative domains, anticipatory urgency signal for positive and
negative domains. The model’s predictive signals were generated for each of the anticipatory periods,
using the model that was fit to each participant, which were then convolved with the canonical HRF
function. We added nuisance parameters that consist of movement estimated from preprocessing,
large derivatives of movement between volumes that were larger than 1 mm, box function during
the anticipatory periods, box function for each experimental run. In our control analysis, we also
added box function during the anticipatory periods that was parametrically modulated by constant
expectation of reward, parametrically modulated cue presentation with state prediction errors.
Regions of interests
The region of interests for VTA/SN was taken from.48 The region of interests for hippocampus was
taken from Neurosynth. Other cluster were taken from our functional results, as described in the
Results sections.
PPI analysis
We performed PPI analysis with a single GLM, which contained 1) BOLD signal of VTA/SN 2) a PPI
regressor that is an interaction between the BOLD signal of VTA/SN and model’s anticipatory value
signal 3) the BOLD signal of vmPFC 4) a PPI regressor that is an interaction between the BOLD
signal of vmPFC and model’s prediction error signal, as well as other onset/movement regressors that
we included in our original analysis.
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Supplemantary figures
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Figure S1: The mechanism by which the model predicts increasing preference for advance information, as a
function of the duration of the wait period. (A,B,C). A classical reward-based decision-making model. This
class of models assumes that a choice is made according to the attractive value of discounted future reward (A).
Because there is no difference in the probability of obtaining reward between the Immediate-info-target and
the Delayed-Info-target, the model assigns the same value to the two choice targets (B). As a result, the model
predicts no preference between the two targets across different delay conditions (C). (D,E,F). The classical
behavioral economic model of the utility of anticipation.75 The model assumes that people experience pleasure
from the anticipation of future reward, in addition to from consumption of the reward itself. Although this
model can capture the well-documented behavior that subjects delay reward consumption, it assigns the same
values to the Immediate-info-target and Delayed-info-target in our task (E). As a result, this model also predicts
indifferent choice between the two targets (F). (G,H,I,J). Our recently proposed model.53 Inspired by an
observation of a dramatic increase in excitement after receiving the information that resolves uncertainty about
upcoming reward,105 this model hypothesizes that the value of anticipation can be boosted by prediction errors
associated with the reward predictive cues (G). Consequently, the value of the Immediate-info target can become
greater than the value of the Delayed-info target, as the duration of the wait becomes longer (H). As a result, the
model predicts that subjects show stronger preference of the Immediate-info-target in longer delay conditions.
This model has been previously validated in a series of behavioral experiments53 (I).
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Figure S2: Our model comparison using integrated Bayesian Information Criterion (iBIC) strongly favors our
full model with values of outcomes and RPE-boosted anticipation, over a model with outcome values but no
anticipatory utility, as well as a model with values of outcomes and anticipation that is not boosted by RPE.
All models include temporal discounting. A smaller score indicates a better model. The score is shown in
log-scale.
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Figure S3: Heterogeneity amongst the participants in how their preferences for Info-target depended on the
reward probability. The plot shows a histogram across the subjects of the slope of a linear fit to the probability
of choosing the Info-target versus the probability of reward.
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Figure S4: Prediction of fMRI signal in one subject (subjust 20). The anticipatory value signal (red). The
discounted reward signal (blue). The anticipation stream signal (black). The dashed curves indicate HRF
convoluted predictions for fMRI.
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Figure S5: Voxels in dosal caudate correlated with anticipatory value signal. The effects in caudate survived
our phase-randomization test (p < 0.001 whole-bran FWE correction). The effects in posterior putamen did
not survived the whole-brain correction. Voxels at p < 0.001 (uncorrelated) are shown for display purposes.
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Figure S6: fMRI correlates in negative (no-reward) domain. (A) Correlation with anticipatory value signal for
no-reward, which is in the negative domain. (B) Correlation with anticipatory urgency signal in the negative
domain. In all panels, voxels at p < 0.005 uncorrected are shown for display purposes.
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Figure S7: Our control analysis using phase-randomization validates the correlation between the model’s an-
ticipatory value signal and the fMRI signal. (A) Schematics of the analysis. In response to recent article
about false-positive correlations between slow signals in neuroscience,32 we performed a new analysis using
phase-randomization of signals. For this, we first transformed our model’s predicted anticipatory signal into the
Fourier space. Then we randomized the phase of each frequency without disturbing the power, before trans-
forming back to the original space. We then ran the standard GLM analysis using this regressor as a model’s
prediction to estimate the regression coefficient. We repeated this for each participant over 100 times (3,900
GLMs in total). We then randomly selected GLM results over participants (one from each participant) to per-
form a standard second level analysis. We repeated this second level analysis for 1,000 times to create a null
distribution of the effect. The null distribution was constructed by taking the maximum correlation over each
GLM result, and this was compared against the original. (B) Our test shows that our original correlation is
significantly greater than by chance, compared to the null distribution constructed by the phase-randomization
method (p < 0.001)
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Figure S8: (A) Correlations with discounted future reward signal. Regions in superior temporal gyrus survives
the whole brain FWE correction p < 0.05. (B) Correlations with anticipatory urgency signal. In all panels,
voxels at p > 0.005 are shown for display purposes.
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Figure S9: The temporal dynamics of the fMRI signal in hippocampus during anticipatory periods. Changes
in activity averaged over participants after receiving a reward predictive cue (orange), after receiving a no-
information cue (magenta), and after receiving a no-reward predictive cue (blue) are shown. The error bar
indicates the SEM.
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Figure S10: There is no correlation between model’s parameter C and the slope of a linear fit to the preference
for Immediate Info target vs reward probability (r = 0.10, p > 0.5).
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See Discussion for more implications (e.g. temporal credit asignment)
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Figure S11: Summary of our findings and implications. (A,B). Our primary findings. (A). We uncovered
three distinctive regions that play together to compute anticipatory pleasure in the brain. The vmPFC, often
described as brain’s common currency region, represented the value of anticipation. The VTA/SN, regions
associated with dopamine and motivation, triggers the boosting of anticipation when the likelihood of desired
outcome increases. The hippocampus, a strong associate of memory and imagination, realized the boosting
of anticipation. (B). We showed that anticipatory pleasure can drive information-seeking behavior. Advance
information can increase the likelihood of a desired outcome, which in turn boosts the pleasure of anticipation.
As a result, people can feel enhanced pleasure from anticipation after receiving advance information. There-
fore people seek advance information of their desired outcomes (information-seeking, or observing), as we
confirmed in our current and past experiments.53 (C,D). Implication of our study. (C). Over-boosted antici-
pation could lead to addiction and gambling. Purchasing alcohol or seeing ‘7-7-7’ in a slot machine increases
the likelihood of receiving desired outcome (e.g. drinking alcohol, receiving money from gambling). This can
boost the anticipatory pleasure. By repeating this many times, the subjective value of alcohol or gambling can
also be boosted over and over, leading to pathological seeking for substance (addiction) and risk (gambling).
Note that our computational model predicts that this over-boosting can happen only to individuals with partic-
ular set of parameter values (e.g. strong boosting and weak discounting). (D). Our study can help to design
personalized psychiatric interventions (computational psychiatry). Subjects perform a behavioral task in a MRI
scanner and we fit our computational model to the behavior. We can identify likely causes of psychiatric dis-
orders (e.g. addiction), by the subject’s parameters estimated by our computational model and brain data. This
will help design personalized psychiatric intervention, for example cognitive behavioral therapy focusing on
aspects of anticipation, as well as medication targeted to specific neuromodulators (e.g. dopamine). Please see
the Discussion section for further details and other implications of our study.
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